Abstract-As the ubiquitous society spreads rapidly, various private information circulates in large quantities. Information increases explosively in recent years, the importance of privacy protection has risen. When the Web services are used, they need not identify who is the user in some cases. In this paper, we propose the authentication method that achieves privacy protection with authorization without identification. Our method makes it possible to protect user's privacy information when the services. We discuss the security of the attacks, and the untraceability from attribute information to identity information. Thereby we show the effectiveness of our method.
I. INTRODUCTION
As the ubiquitous society spreads rapidly, data with various private information circulates in large quantities. Request for the privacy protection has risen in Japan along with the overall enforcement of Act for Protection of Computer Processed Personal Data held by Administrative Organs [1] from April, 2005. Moreover, privacy information is used for purposes other than the original intent. Therefore, it has strong resistance to disclosing needless private information.
The eavesdropping, the spoofing, the modification and the other threats on the network are prevented by the PKI applications. PKI is only a means to lower the threat that exists on the network relatively. Moreover, the eavesdropping prevention by the encryption of the communication is possible. However, the function of anonymity is not provided, so the problem of privacy protection is not solved.
When the Web services are used, there is a case that they need not identify who is the user. However, the authentication and the authorization are done at the same time in ID/password method. In such case, the service provider might record the service usage information: what services are used and who used them. So the authentication scheme becomes more and more necessary. In this paper, we propose the authentication method that achieves privacy protection by using services based on user's authority without identifying. In this method, the regular user who has a regular authority can receive the services with authority but without identifying by service provider, and service provider does not know who the user is. Therefore, our method makes it possible to protect user's privacy information when the services, such as Web service etc., are used.
II. RELATED WORKS
The method of achieving privacy protection is researched with various approaches. Anonymous method and pseudonyms method are typical methods of concealing identity. Anonymous method is an approach that cannot identify an individual from the crowd. Pseudonyms method is an approach that cannot identify by using fake name with untraceability. However, when the same person uses the same fake name, an individual can be specified in this method.
As the research of anonymity using certificate, there is the research that separates authentication and authorization using SPKI (Simple PKI) [2] , [3] , [4] . SPKI certificate is a kind of authorization certificate that does not contain identity information, and identity information can be prevented from leaking by the access control that uses this. However, we employ PKIX (PKI X.509) from the point of the recycling of infrastructure and the easiness of the implementation, because many PKI applications such as SSL and S/MIME use X.509 certificate.
As the research of anonymous authentication using digital signature, there is k-Times Anonymous Authentication (k-TAA) [5] , [6] . k-TAA can achieve the access to the application provider of k-times with anonymity by using escrow/group signature. However, it is based on group signature. Its approach is different from our method that aims achievement on PKI.
Attribute certificate is X.509 certificate that proves certificate owner's attribute information, and it includes information as shown in TABLE I. Attribute certificate has holder field and attributes field although the field of attribute certificate looks like the field of public-key certificate. The holder field identifies attribute certificate holder, and the attributes field gives attribute information about attribute certificate holder. The conventional method to contain attribute information is a method of using the extensions field of public-key certificate. However, there is a problem that the reissuing of public-key certificate is needed along with the revocation of attribute information because the lifetime of attribute information is shorter than the lifetime of public-key generally. Attribute certificate solves this problem by containing attribute information to attribute certificate, and make it possible to reduce the cost of public-key generation and management.
RFC3281 [7] just explains the framework of attribute certificate, and details about actual operation are not explained. Chiba et al. examine the details of registration and the use of attribute information [8] . Imaeda et al. consider the problems and the solutions when attribute certificate is linked to public-key certificate with the objectDigestInfo [9] . They took notice of anonymity because attribute certificate does not contain identity information, and they pointed out that additional research is needed. However, the method of achieving anonymity in using attribute certificate remains as a problem. Therefore, it is necessary to examine the authentication method that effectively uses attribute information and the application scene.
III. AN ANONYMOUS AUTHENTICATION METHOD

A. Basic Idea and Approach
Private information is composed of identity information and attribute information as shown in Figure 1 . Identity information identifies the object person, and attribute information shows the qualification and the authority given to the object person. For instance, "KAKIZAKI" is identity information, and "Postgraduate" is attribute information on "KAKIZAKI". Attribute information is the one component of private information. Thus, attribute information separated from identity information loses value as private information. Attribute information is effective in the case of combining with identity information. If attribute information has no link to identity information, attribute information has the anonymity. When the questionnaires data are processed statistical, identity information is discarded and only attribute information is tallied. This is our basic idea.
Our approach is to apply this basic idea to digital certificate. Our method is an anonymous authentication method that makes it possible that the user can take the services without identifying. The following steps achieve this: identity information and attribute information are separated from private information. Next, public-key certificate with identity information is used to prove the authenticity. Attribute certificate with attribute information is used to prove the authority.
Our method protects user's usage information by concealing what services are used and who used them.
B. Structure
The structure of our method is shown in Figure 2 . Our method is a trusted third party model, and attribute authority, service provider, and user compose it. Attribute Certificate is not bound to Public-key Certificate in our method, thus, the objectDigestInfo is used for the holder field of Attribute Certificate. Attribute Certificate verifier cannot identify who the Attribute Certificate owner is though it can confirm that Attribute Certificate owner is a regular user, by setting the authentication information to the target object of objectDijestInfo.
AuthInfo is decided as follows. First, two random numbers are generated. One is the authentication key between User and Service Provider, and the other is the session key for User. The user key is calculated with XOR of the authentication key and the session key. AuthInfo is made from the authentication key and the user key encrypted with public-key of Attribute Certificate owner which are encrypted with public-key of Service Provider. Hash of AuthInfo is set in objectDigestInfo of the holder field of Attribute Certificate.
There is a possibility to be traced from service usage information when same Attribute Certificate is used. So, we decided to make Attribute Certificate disposable to preclude the possibility of it. Basically, Attribute Certificate is set to one certificate per one session. Therefore, the validity period of Attribute Certificate can be set very short. Thus, Attribute Certificate revocation and CRL (Certificate Revocation List) or OCSP (Online Certificate Status Protocol) might be unnecessary by this setting.
C. Procedure
User operates as follows to take the services of Service Provider and the system flow is shown in Figure 3 .
Issuing Authorization: 11) User decrypts AuthKey which is from SP with private-key of User. And the authentication key is calculated with XOR of the user key and the session key. 12) User pushes the authentication key to SP. 13) SP judges that User is correct owner of AC if the authentication key from User is equal to the key which is taken out of AuthInfo.
IV. DEVELOPMENT
A. Application Scope
We separate authentication and authorization with identity information and attribute information respectively. Herewith, the method makes it possible that the user take the service without identifying by service provider, and it achieves privacy protection by hiding the service usage information. The method is useful under the following conditions.
• The service that is not including privacy information • Two or more services must exist • No meter rate service At the service that is including privacy information, Privacy information can be specified from the service used. As an example of this problem is healthcare information service. Healthcare information is attribute information extremely near privacy information, and the demand of user who wants to be protecting it is strong. However, both identity information and attribute information are needed in the greater part of services of healthcare field. Thus, the method is not useful in such a scene.
At just single service, the user's purpose is to use the only service. Therefore, there is no point in hiding the service usage information.
At meter rate service, the content of service used can be guessed according to the charge of service, because the charge of service is different depending on the content of service or the amount used. Therefore, it is difficult to protect privacy information only by hiding the service usage information.
B. Operative Example
E-learning, the books browsing service, and the video delivery service, etc. are thought as an example of applying our method.
We assume e-learning: the user can freely attend the class which is providing, as long as the user pays the tuition. The user does not want the service provider to ever know what class the user attends. Service provider does not mind as long as the user has regular authority even if the user attends which class. Moreover, service provider can know the popularity of each class although it cannot know who to which class is attending.
The user registers to service provider that provides elearning. Service provider assigns privilege to attribute authority for issuing attribute certificate that is necessary of the service use. Attribute authority issues attribute certificate and the authentication key to the user. The user pushes attribute certificate to service provider, proves the regular user by the authentication key, and takes elearning.
Attribute authority cannot know which class the user attended although it knows which class can be attended and who is the user. Service provider cannot know who the user is although it can confirm which class the user can attend and can know the popularity of each class. As mentioned above, service provider and attribute authority never know who to which class is attending.
In the same way, we assume the books browsing service: a free member can browse only for a free member's although the dues-paying member can browse all books. The user does not want the service provider to ever know what books the user browses. Service provider does not mind as long as the user has regular authority even if the user browses which books.
Last, we assume the video delivery service: there are many genres such as the movie, sports, and dramas, and the user who has contracted the genre can freely watch contents in the genre. The user does not want the service provider to ever know what contents the user watches. Service provider does not mind as long as the user has regular authority even if the user watches which contents. Moreover, service provider can know the popularity of each content.
Thus, the user can freely use the services; howbeit service provider does not record the service usage information. It is possible to protect the service usage information that is privacy information.
V. DISCUSSION
A. Advantage
Our method makes it possible to take the services without identifying and to protect user's privacy. The method has adaptability with PKIX because it uses the Public-key Certificate and Attribute Certificate. Many PKI applications such as SSL and S/MIME use X.509 certificate. PKIX is in widespread than SPKI. Therefore, our method achieved on PKIX has more adaptability to current infrastructure than the method achieved on SPKI [3] , [4] .
Attribute Certificate is made to be disposable to prevent the traceability from service usage information. However, it is preferable to be able to recycle Attribute Certificate as long as attribute does not change. Especially, there is the problem that the issuing cost of Attribute Certificate becomes high in case of the service frequently used. Even if Attribute Certificate is recycled several times, it might be safe enough. However, the possibility that an individual is specified increases by using same Attribute Certificate. Therefore, the level of privacy protection and the issuing cost of Attribute Certificate are trade-offs. 
C. Untraceability
Identity information is not contained in Attribute Certificate which is necessary in the services. Attribute Certificate verifier cannot identify user from Attribute Certificate directly. However, user activity can be traced by service usage information. For instance, user who uses same Attribute Certificate can identify that one is same user. Moreover, there is a possibility that an individual can be identified in the some situations. There is the problem that is the traceability from service usage information from the side of privacy protection. Therefore, we propose the method that Attribute Certificate cannot reuse to prevent it.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we propose the authentication method that achieves privacy protection by using services based on user's authority without identifying. Our method makes it possible to protect user's privacy information when the services, such as Web service etc., are used.
Identity information that identifies an individual is not contained in attribute certificate. And only attribute information for authorization is contained in it. However its holder is bound in the holder field. Attribute certificate verifier can confirm that attribute certificate owner is a regular user although it cannot identify attribute certificate owner directly. Thus, the user can take the services without identifying an individual, and the service provider can provide the services only for a regular user. Our method makes it possible to protect user's privacy because service provider cannot identify user.
We discuss the security of the attacks that are modification, forgery, fraud and spoofing, and the untraceability from attribute information to user's usage information and identity information. Thereby we show the effectiveness of our method.
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